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It’s Time for California to Enact Employment
Protections for Medical Cannabis Patients
KEVIN MURPHY†
California law allows an employer to refuse to hire an applicant or discharge an employee for
consuming medical cannabis in order to treat a serious medical condition, even if an individual
consumes cannabis at home during non-working hours.
For example, in 2001, employer RagingWire Telecommunications fired its newly hired
employee—Gary Ross, a United States Veteran who sustained injuries while serving his country—
for using medical cannabis at home during non-working hours to relieve the pain those injuries
caused. Mr. Ross challenged his termination, and the California Supreme Court sided with
RagingWire, finding that California’s Compassionate Use Act did not protect medical cannabis
patients from termination by their employers.
In contrast to California’s lack of protection for medical cannabis patients, sixteen states provide
some form of statutory protection for individuals like Mr. Ross. In order to protect employees, the
California Legislature must enact legislation prohibiting employers from discriminating against
qualified patients under California’s Compassionate Use Act.
Enacting legislation to protect medical cannabis patients will restore California’s place as a
leader in the cannabis arena. More importantly, it will protect medical cannabis patients like Mr.
Ross, who—without such legislation—will continue to have to make the impossible choice of
choosing between treating their disabilities and keeping their job.

† J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Production Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to Professor Steven Bonorris and Matthew Waldron for their guidance,
support, and helpful comments. Further thanks to the Notes and Production staff of Hastings Law Journal for
all of their hard work.
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INTRODUCTION
Sixteen states provide some form of statutory employment protection for
individuals who use cannabis as a part of their state’s medical cannabis
program.1 Despite being the first state to legalize medical cannabis and the sixth
state to legalize recreational cannabis, California does not provide any form of
employment protection for medical cannabis users.2 California law allows an
employer to refuse to hire an applicant or terminate an employee for consuming
medical cannabis in order to treat a serious medical condition, even if an
individual consumes cannabis during non-working hours.3 To afford
employment protection to medical cannabis patients, California must—for the
first time in the cannabis context—be a follower and not a leader. The California
Legislature must enact legislation prohibiting employers from discriminating
against qualified patients under California’s Compassionate Use Act. In doing
so, the Legislature should adopt language that strikes a balance between
employer and employee interests.
This Note will address the current gap in California medical cannabis
legislation and the need for a legislative solution that will protect medical
cannabis patients while addressing employer concerns. Part I will briefly discuss
the history of cannabis regulation under federal and state law as well as the
interaction between federal and state law,4 starting first with the original federal
prohibition of cannabis and ending with California’s passage of Proposition 64,
which decriminalized recreational cannabis use.5 Part II will examine the
intersection of medical cannabis and employment law, specifically detailing
employers’ and employees’ interests and various states’ successful and
unsuccessful efforts to protect medical cannabis users from workplace

1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813; ARK. CONST. amend. XCVIII § 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a408p; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/40; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2430C; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.32; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 678C.850; NJ ST 24:6I-6.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 262B-9; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW. § 3369; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 427.8; 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10231.2103; 21
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-4; S.D. § 34-20G-22; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16A-15-4.
2. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last visited July 1, 2022); Thomas Fuller, Recreational Pot
is Officially Legal in California, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/us/legal-potcalifornia.html (“California is the sixth state to introduce the sale of recreational marijuana, after Colorado,
Washington, Oregon, Alaska and Nevada.”).
3. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 203 (Cal. 2008) (“Under California law, an
employer may require preemployment drug tests and take illegal drug use into consideration in making
employment decisions.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.45 (“Section 11362.1 does not amend, repeal,
affect, restrict, or preempt: (f) The rights and obligations of public and private employers to maintain a drug and
alcohol free workplace . . . or affect the ability of employers to have policies prohibiting the use of cannabis by
employees and prospective employees, or prevent employers from complying with state or federal law.”)
(emphasis added); Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1222 (Cal. 1997) (holding that drug testing of all
job applications is permissible); Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that drug testing of an existing employee is permissible if there is individualized suspicion of drug use
or if the employee is in a safety sensitive position).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See id.
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discrimination.6 Part III suggests a framework California should adopt, being
mindful of the lessons learned from the multiple unsuccessful attempts by the
Legislature to provide protection for employees.7 This Note then briefly
concludes.8
I. BACKGROUND
The history of cannabis regulation has gone from little to no federal
oversight,9 to a complete ban,10 to state-level legalization for medical use in a
majority of states,11 and finally to the federal government signaling that it too
may be willing to rethink its ban on cannabis use, with the recent passage of the
“Marijuana Opportunity, Reinvestment and Expungement (MORE) Act” in the
House of Representatives.12 However, because it is still illegal under federal law,
states’ legalization of cannabis for medical or recreational use has created
preemption issues regarding the interaction of federal and state law.13 This Part
will discuss the history of cannabis regulation, modern trends towards
decriminalization, state law, and preemption.
A. ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF CANNABIS PROHIBITION
Until the late 1930s, the growth and use of cannabis were legal under
federal law.14 Then, in 1937, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act (“MTA”),
which effectively criminalized cannabis.15 The history of Congress’s enactment
of the MTA is littered with racism and xenophobia, as evidenced by the name of
the MTA itself.16 For much of American history, the drug “cannabis” was not
referred to as “marijuana.” 17 Then, during the Mexican Revolution, numerous
individuals from Mexico immigrated to the United States and brought with them
cannabis, which they referred to as “marihuana.”18 As a tool to stoke xenophobic
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See LISA N. SACCO, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 3
(2014).
10. See 21 U.S.C. § 841.
11. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 2.
12. See Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement (MORE) Act of 2019, S. 2227, 116th
Cong. (2019), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s2227/text/is [hereinafter MORE Act of 2019, S.
2227]; Catie Edmondson, House Passes Landmark Bill Decriminalizing Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/us/politics/house-marijuana.html.
13. See Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 5, 6–7 (2013).
14. See SACCO, supra note 9, at 3.
15. Id. at 4; Marijuana Timeline, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/
cron.html (last visited July 1, 2022) (“The statute effectively criminalized marijuana, restricting possession of
the drug to individuals who paid an excise tax for certain authorized medical and industrial uses.”).
16. See generally Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the Hope for Reform,
23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 797–800 (2019).
17. Id. at 797.
18. Id.
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sentiments and to marginalize Mexican immigrants, anti-cannabis advocates
opted for the term “marihuana” over “cannabis” when describing why the drug
should be criminalized.19 Referring to cannabis as “marihuana” “helped to
portray [it] as something external, something that is invading the
U.S . . . knowing that it sounds Hispanic, [that] it sounds foreign.”20
Additionally, in the lead up to the MTA’s passage, the main proponent of the
bill and the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Henry Anslinger,
used overtly racist language to encourage the drug’s criminalization, claiming
that “[m]ost marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and
entertainers,” and that cannabis was the “most violence-causing drug in the
history of mankind.”21 Because of Anslinger’s comments, Congress enacted the
MTA.22
Thirty years after the MTA’a enactment, the Supreme Court effectively
declared the it unconstitutional in Leary v. United States.23 In response to Leary
and as a part of President Nixon’s “War on Drugs,” Congress passed the
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).24 Although it has well-known medicinal
value,25 the CSA classifies cannabis as a Schedule I drug, meaning that it has “a
high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use,” and “a lack of
accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervision.”26 As a result, it is a
federal crime to “possess,”27 “manufacture, distribute, or dispense” cannabis.28
Like the MTA, the passage of the CSA and the listing of cannabis as a
Schedule I drug was not without criticism or controversy. A commission formed
by President Nixon in 1969 concluded that cannabis “was not as dangerous as
perceived, and recommended decriminalization.”29 Against the report’s
recommendation, Nixon advocated for criminalization.30 Furthermore, John
Ehrlichman, President Nixon’s assistant for domestic affairs, stated in 1994 that

19. See Alfonso Serrano, Weed All About It: The Origins of the Word ‘Marijuana,’ ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec.
14,
2013,
2:59
PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/14/weed-all-aboutittheoriginsofthewordamarijuanaaintheus.html.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Vitiello, supra note 16, at 800.
23. 395 U.S. 6, 12 (1969).
24. SACCO, supra note 9, at 5; Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801.
25. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MEDICINE, THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS:
THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 13 (2017) [hereinafter THE HEALTH
EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS].
26. 21 U.S.C. § 812; Matthew A. Christianson, A Great Schism: Social Norms and Marijuana Prohibition,
4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 233–34 (2010).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 844.
28. Id. § 841.
29. See Robert Solomon, Racism and Its Effect on Cannabis Research, 5 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID
RSCH. 2, 3 (2020).
30. Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/25/archives/transcript-of-the-presidents-news-conference-onforeign-and.html?searchResultPosition=9 (“I read it and reading it did not change my mind. I oppose the
legalization of marijuana and that includes it sale, its possession, and its use.”).
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the Nixon administration used the criminalization of cannabis as a tool to arrest
anti-war and Black Americans.31 Nonetheless, cannabis has remained a
Schedule I drug since the CSA’s enactment.32
B. MODERN TRENDS
Cannabis’s continued placement as a Schedule I drug should not be
interpreted as a proposition that the federal government’s attitude towards
cannabis has remained the same since the CSA’s enactment. Pro-cannabis
policies are increasingly politically popular.33 For example, current federal law
“expressly allows for the distribution of hemp-derived CBD products that
contain 0.3% tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or less to be sold.”34 Additionally,
there have been signs indicating that both the executive and legislative branches
support removing cannabis from the list of Schedule I drugs, or at the very least,
are willing to tolerate states’ recreational and medical cannabis laws.35 For
example, in 2009, David Ogden—Deputy Attorney General at the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”)—sent a memorandum to United States Attorneys directing
them to focus their prosecutorial efforts on “traffickers of illegal drugs” and
“commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana” and not on
individuals who are in compliance with their state’s medical cannabis laws.36 As
a follow up to the Ogden memorandum, Deputy Attorney General James Cole
sent a memorandum in 2013 addressing how federal prosecutors should respond
to multiple states legalizing recreational cannabis.37 The Cole memorandum
reaffirmed the theme of the Ogden memorandum, reiterating that prosecutors
should use their federal resources for the “most significant threats,” such as

31. See Dan Baum, Legalize It All, HARPER’S MAG. (April 2016), https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/
legalize-it-all/; John D. Ehrlichman, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-D-Ehrlichman
(last visited July 1, 2022).
32. Catherine Saint Louis, D.E.A. Keeps Marijuana on List of Dangerous Drugs, Frustrating Advocates,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/health/dea-keeps-marijuana-on-list-ofdangerous-drugs-frustrating-advocates.html?searchResultPosition=5.
33. See Eileen Sullivan, Trump Says He’s Likely to Back Marijuana Bill, in Apparent Break with Sessions,
N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/us/politics/trump-marijuana-bill-states.html;
Isabella Kwai, U.N. Reclassifies Cannabis as Less Dangerous Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/world/europe/cannabis-united-nations-drug-policy.html (stating that with
the approval of the United States and 26 other counties, the U.N. removed “cannabis for medical purposes from
a category of the world’s most dangerous drugs”).
34. Tonya M. Esposito, Renee B. Appel & Jonathan Juie, CBD is Everywhere – But Where Does the FDA
Stand?, SEYFARTH (Aug. 8, 2019), https://laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2019/08/cbd-is-everywherebut-where-does-the-fda-stand/.
35. See Kyle Jaeger, House Postpones Vote on Bill to Federally Legalize Marijuana Until After Election,
MARIJUANA MOMENT (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/house-postpones-vote-on-bill-tofederally-legalize-marijuana-until-after-election/; Sullivan, supra note 33.
36. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys (Oct.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneysinvestigations-and-prosecutions-states.
37. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29,
2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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revenue tied to cannabis sales that benefit “criminal enterprises, gangs, and
cartels” and not on individuals consuming recreational cannabis.38
However, in a 2018 memorandum, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
rescinded both the Cole and Ogden memoranda.39 Sessions sought to restore
enforcement of the CSA as it related to cannabis.40 Although Sessions’
memorandum struck fear in the cannabis community, it did not make any
meaningful change and, oddly, may have helped cannabis advocates.41 Since the
memorandum was sent, federal prosecutors have essentially continued to treat
cannabis as prescribed in the Cole and Ogden memoranda, using their federal
resources for only the most serious threats and not interfering with state-run
medical cannabis programs.42 Moreover, both Democrats and Republicans
opposed the Sessions memorandum.43 In fact, the Sessions memorandum
sparked the introduction of a bipartisan bill by Senators Cory Gardner and
Elizabeth Warren that sought to bar the federal government from interfering with
state cannabis laws.44
Congress, for its part, has also shown support for cannabis legalization.45
In 2013, Congress approved the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment.46 That
amendment prevents the DOJ from using federal money to prosecute individuals
who use medical cannabis in compliance with their state’s laws.47 The
amendment is still in effect as of the writing of this paper.48
Perhaps the most promising congressional action thus far was the House of
Representative’s passing the MORE Act in December 2020 with bipartisan
support. 49 The Act would have completely removed cannabis from the CSA.50
Though a promising sign, the bill did not advance in the Senate. But the Act was

38. Id.
39. See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., to All United States Attorneys (Jan. 4,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
40. See id.
41. Kyle Jaeger, One Year After Jeff Sessions Rescinded a Federal Marijuana Memo, the Sky Hasn’t
Fallen, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/one-year-after-jeff-sessionsrescinded-a-federal-marijuana-memo-the-sky-hasnt-fallen/.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See Sullivan, supra note 33.
45. Interpreting the Renewed Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment: A Loophole for Enforcement?, THOMPSON
COBURN LLP: BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/trackingcannabis/post/2017-05-31/interpreting-the-renewed-rohrabacher-farr-amendment-a-loophole-for-enforcement.
46. See id.
47. See id.; see also Zachary S. Roman, Tenth Circuit Decision Clears the Way for Further Judicial
Consideration of Application of Recently Reenacted Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, REED SMITH (Dec. 27,
2019), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/12/tenth-circuit-decision-clears-the-way-for-furtherjudicial-consideration (citing United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016)).
48. See Roman, supra note 47.
49. See Edmondson, supra note 12.
50. See MORE Act of 2019, S. 2227, supra note 12.
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reintroduced in May 2021, passed by the House on April 1, 2022, and currently
awaits a vote in the Senate.51
C. STATE LAW
The recent change in tone from the federal government regarding cannabis
was likely due to the dramatic increase in state medical and recreational cannabis
legalization over the last twenty-five years.52 Spurred by evidence of cannabis’s
medicinal value, such as its ability to relieve chronic pain,53 thirty-seven states
and four territories currently permit cannabis for medical use.54 In addition,
eighteen states have legalized cannabis for recreational use.55 As stated
previously, California was the first state to enact a medical cannabis program in
1996 and one of the first to legalize recreational use.56 Because this Note focuses
on the intersection of medical cannabis and employment law in California,
discussion in this section will be limited to California’s legal framework of
medical cannabis. Please note that, although there are many similarities between
medical cannabis laws amongst states, the details of each state’s laws vary. For
example, Minnesota limits the ingestion of medical cannabis to liquid or pill
form, while California allows medical users to smoke cannabis.57 What follows
is a general discussion of the current law in California and its interaction with
federal law.
In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215, also known as the
Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”).58 CUA permitted “qualified patients”59 with
a “serious medical condition”60 to possess and consume medical cannabis after
51. History-Making Legislation to Repeal Marijuana Prohibition Reintroduced, NORML (May 28, 2021),
https://norml.org/blog/2021/05/28/history-making-legislation-to-repeal-marijuana-prohibition-reintroduced/;
Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement (MORE) Act, H.R. 3617, 117th Cong. (2021)
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3617/all-actions (last visited July 1,
2022).
52. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 2.
53. See THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND CANNABINOIDS, supra note 25, at 85 (“In adults with
chronic pain, patients who were treated with cannabis or cannabinoids are more likely to experience a clinically
significant reduction in pain symptoms.”).
54. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 2.
55. See id.
56. See id.; Fuller, supra note 2.
57. Compare MINN. STAT. § 152.22 (“Medical cannabis . . . [must] be delivered in the form of: (1)
liquid . . . or (5) any other method, excluding smoking, approved by the commissioner.”) (emphasis added), with
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (stating that it “shall be lawful under state and local law” to “smoke
or ingest cannabis or cannabis products”).
58. See BILL JONES, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at 42 (1996),
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/1996-general/sov-complete.pdf; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 11362.1–11362.9.
59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (“Qualified patient means a person who is entitled to the
protections of Section 1132.6, but who does not have an identification card issued pursuant to this article.”).
60. Id. (“Serious medical condition means all of the following medical conditions: (1) Acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS); (2) Anorexia; (3) Arthritis; (4) Cachexia; (5) Cancer; (6) Chronic Pain; (7)
Glaucoma; (8) Migraine; (9) Persistent muscle spasms, including, but not limited to, spasms associated with
multiple sclerosis; (10) Seizures, including, but not limited to, seizures associated with epilepsy; (11) Severe
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receiving a physician’s recommendation.61 Additionally, CUA established an
identification card system where qualified patients can apply and receive a
medical cannabis identification card.62 The card “is used to help law
enforcement identify the cardholder as being able to legally possess certain
amounts of medical marijuana under specific conditions.”63 However, CUA
does not require qualified patients to obtain the card in order to receive medical
cannabis.64 In fact, qualified patients are incentivized to not apply for an
identification card because they must pay a fee and renew the card annually.65
Because of this, the true number of California medical cannabis users is
unknown.66 In the fiscal year 2019–2020, the California Department of Public
Health stated that California counties issued only 3,335 identification cards,
down from a high of 12,659 cards issued in 2012.67 However, the estimated
number of medical cannabis patients is much higher, as current estimates are
that between 915,000 and 1.2 million Californians currently consume medical
cannabis.68
In 2016, twenty years after the passage of the CUA, California voters again
voted to expand access to cannabis by approving Proposition 64.69 Proposition
64 makes it lawful for persons twenty-one years of age or older to “possess,
process, transport, purchase . . . smoke or ingest cannabis or cannabis
products.”70 Importantly, for purposes of this paper, Proposition 64 explicitly
does not “affect the ability of employers to have policies prohibiting the use of
cannabis by employees and prospective employees.”71
D. INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE MEDICAL CANNABIS LAWS AND FEDERAL
LAW

Before turning to the issues raised in the employment arena as a result of
states legalizing medical cannabis, a brief discussion of the interaction between
nausea; (12) Any other chronic or persistent medical symptom that either: (A) Substantially limits the ability of
the person to conduct one or more major life activities as defined in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 . . . (B) if not alleviated, may cause serious harm to the patient’s safety or physical or mental health.”).
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1–11362.9.
62. See id.
63. See Medical Marijuana Identification Card: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), CAL. DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH, https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/Pages/MMICP-FAQs.aspx (last visited July 1, 2022).
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1–11362.9.
65. See id. Applicants do not, however, have to pay sales and use tax when making retail purchases of
medical cannabis. See Medical Marijuana Identification Card: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note
63.
66. Number
of
Legal
Medical
Marijuana
Patients,
PROCON
(May
17,
2018),
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/number-of-legal-medical-marijuana-patients/.
67. Patient, Primary Caregiver, Medi-Cal and CMSP Card Data, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/Pages/MMP-Card-Data.aspx (last visited July 1, 2022).
68. See Number of Legal Medical Marijuana Patients, supra note 66.
69. See ALEX PADILLA, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 8, 2016 GENERAL ELECTION 12 (2016),
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov.pdf.
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1–11362.9
71. Id.
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state law and federal law is warranted because any legislature enacting
protections for cannabis users must be mindful that cannabis is still illegal under
federal law.72 For the most part, state cannabis laws and federal laws have been
able to coexist.73
Starting with the CSA, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
courts can void state medical cannabis laws if the CSA preempts those laws;
however, most courts have found that the CSA does not preempt a state’s
medical cannabis law.74 A preemption issue arises anytime Congress and the
states pass laws that govern the same activity.75 Article VI of the Constitution
contains the Supremacy Clause.76 That clause “provides that the Constitution,
and laws and treaties made pursuant to it, are the supreme law of the land.”77
Thus, when state law conflicts with federal law, federal law displaces state law.78
Generally, there are two broad types of preemption: express and implied
preemption.79 Under express preemption, Congress explicitly states its intention
as to whether the federal law at issue preempts state law.80 In contrast, under
implied preemption, courts infer federal preemption based on Congress’s actions
that it intended to preempt state law even though it did not expressly state it.81
Implied preemption comes in three forms: (1) field preemption, where
“preemption will be found if there is a clear congressional intent to have federal
law occupy a particular area of law”;82 (2) conflict preemption, where a federal
and state law “are mutually exclusive,” such that “a person cannot comply with
both”;83 and (3) obstacle preemption, where “a state or local law is deemed to
impede the achievement of a federal objective.”84 The CSA includes an express
preemption clause.85 It says,
[n]o provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates,

72. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
73. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 106–07, 110–11 (2015).
74. See id. at 110; Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 105 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010) (“[B]ecause the CUA and the MMPA do not mandate conduct that federal law prohibits, nor pose an
obstacle to federal enforcement of federal law, the enactments’ decriminalization provisions are not preempted
by federal law.”). But see Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. and Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or.
2010) (holding that the CSA preempted Oregon’s medical cannabis law that authorized the use of cannabis
because “affirmatively authorizing a use that federal law prohibits stands as an obstacle to the implementation
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Controlled Substances Act”).
75. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 73, at 111.
76. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (5th ed. 2017).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 454.
81. Mikos, supra note 13, at 9–10.
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 467.
83. Id. at 461.
84. Id. at 462.
85. See 21 U.S.C. § 903.
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including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State,
unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.86

In interpreting the above provision under an express preemption analysis,
it is possible to comply with both the CSA and a state’s medical or recreational
cannabis law.87 As one commentator stated, “[o]nly if a state law required a
citizen to possess, manufacture, or distribute marijuana in violation of federal
law would it be impossible for a citizen to comply with both state and federal
law.”88 For example, because California’s Compassionate Use Act does not
require qualified patients to possess cannabis, it is not preempted by the CSA.89
Nonetheless, courts have also interpreted the CSA’s preemption provision to
have the same meaning as the doctrines of conflict and obstacle preemption,
meaning “state law is preempted by the CSA if it makes compliance with federal
law impossible or if it undermines the full achievement of Congress’s
objectives.”90 Still, even under the conflict and obstacle preemption doctrines,
the CSA has not preempted most state cannabis laws, including California’s
Compassionate Use Act.91 Furthermore, in a preview of the discussion that will
follow on the intersection of medical cannabis laws and employment law, courts
have found that the CSA does not preempt state employment laws protecting
medical cannabis users.92
Aside from the CSA, two additional federal laws have the potential to
conflict with state medical cannabis laws: The Drug Free Workplace Act
(“DFWA”) and the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations on
illegal drug use.93 Under the DFWA, employers with government contracts over
$250,000 must comply with its provisions, which include maintaining a drugfree workplace.94 However, the DFWA does “not require drug testing or require

86. Id.
87. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 73, at 106.
88. Id.
89. See id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.765.
90. Mikos, supra note 13, at 14.
91. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 73, at 107, 110–11; Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim,
115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that
regulation of intrastate cannabis cultivation was a “valid exercise of federal power,” but not addressing whether
the CSA preempted the CUA). But see Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. and Indus., 230 P.3d
518, 529 (Or. 2010).
92. See Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326, 334 (D. Conn. 2017) (stating that
the CSA does not regulate employment practices in any manner).
93. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8106; 49 C.F.R. § 40.23.
94. These provisions include (1) “publishing a statement notifying employees that the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, possession, or use of a controlled substance [such as cannabis] is
prohibited in the person’s workplace,” (2) “establishing a drug-free awareness,” (3) notifying an employee that
as a condition of employment, the employee must “notify the employer of any criminal drug statute conviction
for a violation occurring in the workplace,” (4) “imposing a sanction on, or requiring the satisfactory
participation in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program by any employee who is convicted” of a
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that an employer take any disciplinary action against an employee who tests
positive for illegal drugs.”95 Furthermore, because the DFWA’s jurisdiction
resides only in the workplace, “[a]n employer could still obtain drug-free
workplace certification even if it retains employees who test positive on a drug
test but do not use or possess drugs at work.”96 Thus, a statute protecting medical
cannabis users would violate the DFWA only if it allowed users to possess or
ingest cannabis in the workplace.97 Because most state statutes protecting
medical cannabis users do not allow possession or ingestion in the workplace,
the DFWA and state law rarely conflict.98
The DOT regulates workers such as truck drivers, pilots, flight attendants,
air traffic controllers, school bus drivers, and ship captains.99 DOT regulations
state that if an employee has a positive drug test result for cannabis, they “must
immediately [be] remove[d] . . . from performing safety-sensitive functions.”100
To avoid conflicting with DOT regulations, almost all state laws protecting
medical cannabis users from termination of employment contain a provision that
exempts DOT regulated employers from abiding by the state law.101
II. MEDICAL CANNABIS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
In response to numerous states legalizing medical cannabis, individuals
registered under their state’s medical cannabis program (“patient-employees”)
have struggled to reconcile their right to use medical cannabis to treat their
disabilities with their employers’ policies against cannabis use.102 On one hand,
there are the interests of patient-employees who need to use cannabis to treat
their disabilities.103 On the other hand, there are the interests of employers who

criminal drug offense occurring in the workplace, and (5) “making a good faith effort to continue to maintain a
drug-free workplace through implementation” of these provisions. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8106.
95. See Stacy Hickox, It’s Time to Rein in Employer Drug Testing, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 419, 433
(2017).
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 338 F. Supp. 3d 78, 84 (D. Conn. 2018) (holding
that the DFWA did not conflict with Connecticut’s medical cannabis statute because the DFWA does not require
drug testing, nor does it prohibit federal contractors from employing someone who uses illegal drugs outside the
workplace).
99. Jim L. Swart, DOT “Medical Marijuana” Notice, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.transportation.gov/odapc/medical-marijuana-notice. Employers and employees can determine if
they are subject to DOT regulations by using this website: https://www.transportation.gov/odapc/am-icovered#no-back.
100. 49 C.F.R. § 40.23.
101. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4905A.
102. See, e.g., Coats v. Dish Network LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850, 852–53 (Colo. 2015) (holding that a
quadriplegic employee’s use of medical cannabis outside of working hours and in compliance with Colorado’s
Medical Marijuana Amendment, was “unlawful under federal law,” and thus termination by his employer for
using medical cannabis was not in violation of Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute).
103. See, e.g., Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 203 (Cal. 2008) (stating that the plaintiff,
who suffered injuries while serving in the United States Air Force, began to use cannabis to treat his pain because
he could not “obtain relief from pain through other medications”).
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want to avoid employing an individual who may be impaired on the job.104 These
competing interests often arise in three key areas: civil liability, impairment, and
drug testing. This Part will first discuss those key issues because they affect
every state that has legalized medical cannabis. Then, discussion will focus on
some of the legal challenges patient-employees have exercised in California,
specifically focusing on the seminal California Supreme Court case, Ross v.
RagingWire Telecommunications Inc.,105 before finally turning to an
examination of states that have enacted employment-protection laws that
prohibit employers from terminating patient-employees based on their status as
medical cannabis patients.
A. CIVIL LIABILITY, IMPAIRMENT, AND DRUG TESTING
On-the-job impairment, employee drug testing, and civil liability concerns
affect almost all employers and patient-employees.106 In states that do not
provide statutory protection for patient-employees, employer termination
policies for medical cannabis use are often overinclusive—negatively impacting
patient-employees who are not impaired on the job and who do not increase the
likelihood that an employer will face civil liability.107
Like any other potentially mind-altering substance, such as alcohol,
cannabis raises the concern that patient-employees using cannabis will lead to
civil liability resulting from on-the-job injuries and accidents.108 In addition,
employers are concerned about absenteeism and a lack of productivity from
employees that use medical cannabis.109 Unlike alcohol, there currently is no test
that can reliably measure whether or not a patient-employee is impaired on the
job due to cannabis.110 Quest Diagnostics, one of the leading drug testing
104. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8106; Hickox, supra note 95, at 427 (stating that employers drug test to “protect
the safety of employees and the general public, and to reduce costs associated with absenteeism, medical claims,
and reduced productivity associated with drug use”).
105. 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008).
106. See Policies for Marijuana Use in the Workplace, SHRM (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/hrtoday/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/policies-for-marijuana-use-in-the-workplace.aspx
(stating that only sixteen to twenty percent of surveyed organizations “do not conduct drug testing” for cannabis
use for “any of their employees”).
107. See Hickox, supra note 95, at 421.
108. See id. at 422; George Fitting, Careless Conflicts: Medical Marijuana Implication for Employer
Liability in the Wake of Vialpando v. Ben’s Automotive Services, 102 IOWA L. REV. 259, 270 (2016) (stating
that employers could be liable for injuries caused by their employees under the tort theories of respondeat
superior and negligent hiring); Megan Gates, The Science Behind Marijuana Testing at Work, SHRM (Feb. 5,
2020),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/employee-relations/pages/the-science-behindmarijuana-testing-at-work.aspx (stating that “the ability to process information, make a quick decision and act
accordingly can be affected when under the influence of marijuana” and “in some cases cause catastrophic,
unintended effects”); Stephanie Spiers, Will the Smoke Blow Over: Employers’ Concerns as States Expand
Protections for Medical Marijuana Users, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 481, 514–15 (2019) (“Considering the
different methods for which marijuana can be administered in conjunction with the concentration levels of THC,
a major concern for employers is the duration of an employee’s impairment or ‘high’”).
109. See Hickox, supra note 95, at 422.
110. See Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana, QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, https://www.questdiagnostics.com/
dms/Documents/Employer-Solutions/Brochures/marijuana-FAQ/Quest%20Marijuana%20FAQ.pdf
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providers for employers, states—in regard to cannabis testing—that “while
employment policies often prohibit employees from using drugs or being
impaired at the worksite or during work hours, there is currently no drug
workforce test . . . that can inform an employer as to whether an employee is
impaired.”111 This presents several problems. Without the ability to definitively
determine impairment, an employer is left with less-than-satisfactory options to
judge whether an employee was impaired or not.112
Unsurprisingly, many employers, in an effort to minimize risk, opt for a
zero-tolerance policy,113 meaning that any positive test for cannabis can result
in automatic termination of the patient-employee.114 This approach is likely
overinclusive because depending on a variety of factors, such as whether a
patient-employee is a frequent or infrequent cannabis user, a positive drug test
could indicate cannabis use that occurred between one and thirty days prior to
the drug test.115 More importantly, a positive drug test does not indicate whether
the patient-employee was ever impaired, let alone impaired on the job.116
This problem is best exemplified by the Colorado Supreme Court case
Coats v. Dish Network, LLC.117 In that case, defendant Dish Network fired
plaintiff Brandon Coats after Mr. Coats tested positive for cannabis.118 Mr.
Coats, a quadriplegic with limited use of his hands, had been working for Dish
for three-years as a “telephone customer service representative” before his
termination.119 Due to his “paralyzed condition,” Mr. Coats experiences
“involuntary muscle movements, or spasms, which are both painful and
embarrassing.”120 Finding that no other medication quelled his muscle spasms,
Mr. Coats turned to medical cannabis for relief.121 The cannabis dramatically
decreased his muscle spasms and improved his quality of life.122 Despite
consuming medical cannabis “at home, after work, and in accordance with his
[cannabis] license and Colorado state law,” Dish terminated Mr. Coats after his
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200320054025/https://www.questdiagnostics.com/dms/Documents/EmployerSolutions/Brochures/marijuana-FAQ/Quest%20Marijuana%20FAQ.pdf] (last visited July 1, 2022).
111. Id.
112. See Gates, supra note 108 (“What you need to remember is it doesn’t matter if it’s urine, oral fluid or
hair testing—it just reflects use . . . [i]t doesn’t inform you whether someone was impaired or what their usage
patterns are.”).
113. See Policies for Marijuana Use in the Workplace, supra note 106 (“The majority of HR professional
indicated their organizations have a zero-tolerance policy (i.e., use is not permitted for any reason) (73%–
82%).”).
114. See Laura P. Johnson, Drug Testing: Is Zero Tolerance Still the Best Policy?, ALLEN & GOOCH (May
15, 2019), https://www.allengooch.com/employee-drug-screen/.
115. See Hickox, supra note 95, at 421; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, THE NEW AGE OF MARIJUANA 11 (2019).
116. See Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana, supra note 110.
117. See Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2015).
118. See id. at 850–51.
119. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2015), 2014 WL 3738680,
at *18–20.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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positive drug test in conformity with its drug-free workplace policy.123 Mr. Coats
subsequently sued Dish, and the Colorado Supreme Court found that his
termination was lawful.124
Instead of focusing on the court’s legal reasoning, the more important
takeaway from this case, for this Note’s purposes, is that it exemplifies how an
employer’s zero-tolerance drug policy can be overinclusive and harm
individuals like Mr. Coats, who allegedly “was a productive employee” who
“received satisfactory performance reviews” and was never suspected “of being
impaired or under the influence at work.”125 Additionally, the problem
exemplified by the Coats decision will likely become more prevalent as more
states legalize medical and recreational cannabis.126 Since 2015, positive
cannabis drug tests in the U.S. workforce have increased by almost thirty
percent.127
Without any protections in place, a positive drug test, in most cases, gives
an employer the right to terminate an employee like Mr. Coats—even if that
employee was not actually impaired on the job.128 In response to this dilemma,
employees have used several different legal methods to challenge their
employers’ adverse action.129 Ultimately, as the next section will detail by
looking through the lens of Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications Inc.,130
seeking judicial intervention has been largely unsuccessful in California and
other states that do not provide express statutory protection for patientemployees.131
B. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY PROTECTIONS IS CONSISTENTLY EVIDENCED BY
CASE LAW
Ross was one of the first cases that addressed how a state’s medical
cannabis statute affects employment law. It also demonstrated that courts will
almost always uphold an employer’s termination of a patient-employee based
123. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015); Connor P. Burns, I Was Gonna Get a
Job, but Then I Got High: An Examination of Cannabis and Employment in the Post-Barbuto Regime, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 643, 662 (2019) (“As Brandon Coats put it, ‘I was under the impression that we had passed a law, and
we had made it legal.’”).
124. Coats, 350 P.3d at 851.
125. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2015), 2014 WL 3738680,
at *18–20; see Hickox, supra note 95, at 421.
126. See Workforce Drug Testing Positivity Climbed to Highest Rate in 16 Years, New Quest Diagnostics
Drug
Testing
Index
Analysis
Finds,
QUEST
DIAGNOSTICS
(Aug.
25,
2020),
https://newsroom.questdiagnostics.com/2020-08-25-Workforce-Drug-Testing-Positivity-Climbed-to-HighestRate-in-16-Years-New-Quest-Diagnostics-Drug-Testing-Index-TM-Analysis-Finds.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Coats, 350 P.3d, at 851.
129. See infra Part II(B).
130. 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008).
131. See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. and Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010); Roe
v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 597 (Wash. 2011); Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2012); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Company, 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M.
2016); Coles v. Harris Teeter, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 3d 185, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2016).
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on the employee’s status as a medical cannabis patient or a positive drug test,
unless the state provides express statutory protections for patient-employees.132
In Ross, plaintiff Gary Ross was a medical cannabis user under California’s
Compassionate Use Act.133 Mr. Ross used medical cannabis to treat back injuries
“that he sustained while serving in the United States Air Force.”134 As a part of
his job offer, defendant RagingWire required that Mr. Ross take a drug test.135
Mr. Ross informed both the clinic that administered the test and RagingWire that
he used medical cannabis to treat his back injuries.136 Despite the advanced
warning, upon receipt of his positive test, RagingWire fired Mr. Ross.137 Mr.
Ross sued RagingWire, arguing that it violated California’s Fair Employment
and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and that his termination was in violation of public
policy.138
Before turning to the California Supreme Court’s ruling, a brief primer on
FEHA is necessary to understand the reasoning behind the court’s decision. The
California Legislature modeled FEHA after the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). However, under California law, the ADA “provides a floor of
protection,” and FEHA affords “additional protections.”139 FEHA generally
makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee or job applicant based on
the employee or job applicant’s physical disability, mental disability, or medical
condition.”140 However, an employer can refuse to hire or discharge an
employee if the employee “is unable to perform the employee’s essential duties
even with reasonable accommodation,” due to their medical condition, or

132. Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 203 (Cal. 2008). It should be noted that two states
have found for patient-employees even where state law did not provide express statutory protection for medical
cannabis users. In Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E. 3d 37, 40–41, 45, 48 (Mass. 2017), the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a patient-employee, whose employer fired her for testing positive for
cannabis, could bring a cause of action under Massachusetts’s version of the ADA because the “use and
possession of medically prescribed marijuana by a qualifying patient is as lawful as the use and possession of
any other prescribed medication.” The court relied on a provision of Massachusetts’s cannabis law that stated,
“patients shall not be denied ‘any right or privilege’ on the basis of their medical marijuana use.” Id. at 45.
California’s Compassionate Use Act does not contain a similar provision; thus, the court noted is why the
outcome in Barbuto differed from Ross. Id. at 45 n.7 (“The language of the Massachusetts medical marijuana
act distinguishes this case from [Ross v. RagingWire because] [t]he California medical marijuana law at
issue . . . did not contain language protecting medical marijuana uses from the denial of any right or privilege.”).
Similarly, in Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 241 N.J. 285, 287 (2020), the New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of a lower court that found a patient-employee could allege a claim under New Jersey’s
Law Against Discrimination for failure to accommodate plaintiff’s disability even though accommodation would
include use of medical cannabis during non-working hours. The usefulness of the Barbuto and Wild holdings is
limited as it relates to this paper because the Ross decision foreclosed similar relief under FEHA.
133. Ross, 174 P.3d at 202.
134. Id. at 203.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1.
140. Id. § 12940.
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physical or mental disabilities.141 The ADA and FEHA treat legal and illegal
drugs differently. Regarding legally prescribed drugs, an employer can
discharge an employee only if the prescribed medication “either prevents the
employee from performing the essential job functions of their position or creates
a direct threat to the health or safety of the employee or others.”142 A direct
threat is a term of art in the ADA and FEHA.143 ADA regulations define it as a
“significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.”144
On the other hand, the ADA and FEHA do not protect illegal drug use, and thus,
an employer can refuse to hire a job applicant or discharge an employee based
on such use.145
Mr. Ross argued that, under FEHA, RagingWire had a duty “to
accommodate his use of marijuana” at home, just as an employer had a duty to
accommodate an employee’s use of a prescription drug.146 Mr. Ross claimed that
California’s Compassionate Use Act essentially made cannabis a prescription
drug; therefore, it fell under FEHA’s protection.147 Thus, Mr. Ross argued
RagingWire could terminate him only if it could show that his use of cannabis
either prevented him “from performing [his] essential job functions” or created
“a direct threat to the health or safety” of others.148
The California Supreme Court rejected Mr. Ross’s argument, stating that
the Compassionate Use Act did not give cannabis the “same status as any legal
prescription drug.”149 The court further held that “nothing in the text or history
of the Compassionate Use Act” suggested that it addressed “the respective rights
and obligations of employers and employees.”150 Therefore, Mr. Ross could not
allege a claim under FEHA.151 Similarly, the court rejected Mr. Ross’s claim
that his termination was in violation of “public policies supported by the
Compassionate Use Act” and FEHA.152 The court stated that “nothing in the
[Compassionate Use Act’s] text or history” indicated that it established a
“fundamental public policy requiring employers to accommodate” cannabis use
by employees.153
141. See id.
142. BURKE DUNPHY & MADELINE MILLER, NEWEST DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKPLACE DRUG AND ALCOHOL
LAWS 18–19 (2019), https://sloansakai.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/10-2019-AC-Dunphy-Miller-NewestDevelopments-in-Workplace-Drug-and-Alcohol-Law.pdf (emphasis added).
143. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
144. See id.
145. See DUNPHY & MILLER, supra note 142, at 18.
146. Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008).
147. See id.
148. See id.; DUNPHY & MILLER, supra note 142, 18–19.
149. Ross, 174 P.3d at 204.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 204, 208.
152. See id. at 208.
153. See id; see also Shepherd v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01901-DAD-BAM, 2016 WL
4126705, at *1–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016) (similarly holding that a medical cannabis user, whose employer fired
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The Ross decision mirrored the outcome that many patient-employees
faced in states that did not provide express statutory protection for medical
cannabis patients.154 For example, in Roe v. Teletech Customer Care
Management (Colorado) LLC,155 the plaintiff—a Washington resident who used
medical cannabis to treat her “debilitating migraine headaches that caused
chronic pain” and found that medical cannabis allowed her “to care for her
children and to work”—sued her employer after it fired her for testing positive
for cannabis.156 The plaintiff in Teletech alleged her termination violated
Washington’s medical cannabis law.157 The Washington Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiff’s argument, stating “there is no evidence voters intended
[Washington’s medical cannabis law] to provide employment protections or to
prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for medical marijuana
use.”158 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan’s Medical Marijuana Act
did not regulate private employment.159 Following the trend, in Garcia v.
Tractor Supply Co.,160 the United States District Court of New Mexico held,
relying on Ross, that an employee could not bring a cause of action under New
Mexico’s medical cannabis law and its Human Rights Act because “medical
marijuana is not an accommodation that must be provided for by the
employer.”161
Each of these states had one thing in common: none provided express
statutory protection for patient-employees.162 In contrast to those states, sixteen
other states have provided express statutory employment protection for patientemployees.163 For the most part, patient-employees in these states have been able
to successfully allege causes of action against their employers after their
employers fired them due to their medical cannabis use or status as medical

him based on a positive drug test, could not bring a FEHA or “wrongful termination in violation of public policy”
claim).
154. See Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 594 (Wash. 2011); Casias v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2012); Coles v. Harris Teeter, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 3d 185, 188
(D.D.C. 2016); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1228–29 (D.N.M. 2016). Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit held in James v. City of Costa Mesa that “medical marijuana use is not protected by the ADA.”
700 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 2012).
155. 257 P.3d 586 (Wash. 2011) (en banc).
156. See id. at 588–89.
157. See id. at 589.
158. See id. at 594.
159. See Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2012).
160. 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D.N.M. 2016).
161. See id. at 1228–29.
162. See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. and Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010); Roe
v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 597 (Wash. 2011); Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2012); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M.
2016); Coles v. Harris Teeter, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 3d 185, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2016).
163. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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cannabis patients.164 The next section will focus on a few of these states,
showing how the statutory scheme used by these states protects patientemployees while also still protecting employer interests.
C. STATES THAT PROVIDE EXPRESS STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR MEDICAL
CANNABIS USERS
The sixteen states that provide some form of employment protection have
done so in different ways.165 Some states have enacted stand-alone provisions
within their respective medical cannabis statutes,166 while others have
incorporated protection into their existing disability law framework.167 This
section will analyze how the states that provide the strongest protections for
patient-employees—Delaware and New York—have attempted to balance
patient-employee and employer interests. Additionally, discussion will focus on
Arizona, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Oklahoma, which exhibit how broad
exceptions to a statute allow courts to have more discretion, which, in turn, could
lead to the swallowing of the statute’s intended protections.168
1. Delaware
Delaware’s employee-protection statute states that an employer “may not
discriminate against a person in hiring, termination or . . . otherwise penalize a
person . . . based upon the person’s status as a [registered medical cannabis
patient] . . . or . . . the person’s positive drug test for [cannabis].”169 However,
these protections do not apply if (1) “the patient used, possessed or was impaired
by” cannabis at work or (2) a failure to discriminate “would cause an employer”
to lose federal funding or licensing.170 The term “impaired” may prove to be
problematic because currently there is no drug test that can accurately measure
whether an individual was impaired by cannabis.171 Critically, however, the
statute appears to modify or further define the term “impaired” when it states
that “a registered qualifying patient shall not be considered to be under the
influence of marijuana solely because of the presence of metabolites or
components of marijuana.”172 Although “under the influence of” and
“impairment” are not exactly the same, they are used synonymously in other
contexts, such as in Arizona’s employee-protection statute (which is almost
164. See, e.g., Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 3d 761, 781 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“Following
Noffsinger and Chance, the Court concludes that there is an implied private cause of action for violations of
[Arizona’s Medical Marijuana Act].”).
165. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A, with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW. § 3369(2).
166. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A.
167. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
168. Please note that state statutes that afford protection to patient-employees will generally be referred to
as “employee-protection statutes.”
169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (2021).
170. Id.
171. See Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana, supra note 110.
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4907A (2021) (emphasis added).
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exactly the same as Delaware’s) and in dictionaries.173 Accepting that the term
“impaired” and the phrase “under the influence of” are synonymous, the statute
prohibits an employer from proving an employee was impaired based solely on
a positive drug test.174 Thus, an employer must produce other evidence to show
impairment, which further protects patient-employees.175 Furthermore,
Delaware’s statute would likely have protected the patient-employees in Ross,
Teletech, and Coats from termination because the employers in those cases
terminated their patient-employees either on the basis of a positive drug test or
their status as medical cannabis patients.176
Delaware’s employee protection statute also addresses employer
interests.177 The statute permits an employer to discharge an employee who “was
impaired” by cannabis while at work.178 Although employers will probably not
be able to rely on a positive drug test to prove impairment, employers can opt
for other methods to prove that an employee was impaired in conjunction with
a positive drug test.179 One such method is “impairment testing” or “fit for duty
testing.”180 These methods “focus on detecting impaired performance rather than
on identifying the specific causes of the impairment.”181 An employer can test
for impairment through direct observation of an employee, such as by noticing
“changes to an employee’s . . . Speech, . . .Actions, Movement . . . [or]
Appearance.”182 Additionally, impairment testing can be completed through

173. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2814 (2015) (“[A] registered qualifying patient shall not be considered
to be under the influence of marijuana solely because of the presence of metabolites or components of marijuana
that appear in insufficient concentration to cause impairment.”) (emphasis added); Driving Under The Influence,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The offense of operating a motor vehicle in a physically or
mentally impaired condition, esp. after consuming alcohol or drugs.”) (emphasis added); Under The Influence,
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/under—the—influence (last visited July 1, 2022)
(defining “under the influence” as “impaired functioning”) (emphasis added); see also Timothy Holly, Analysis:
Marijuana Rulings Tilt Toward Employee Rights Over Employers, DEL. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/marijuana-rulings-favor-employees/ (stating a proposed Delaware bill
to legalize recreational cannabis defined “under the influence” as an “individual [who] is less able than the
individual would ordinarily have been, either mentally or physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient
physical control, or due care in exercising the responsibilities of their job”).
174. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4905A, 4907A (2021).
175. See id. §§ 4905A, 4907A (2021). The statute does not specify what other evidence an employer should
use to evidence impairment.
176. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A (2021); Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d
200, 203 (Cal. 2008); Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 588–89 (Wash. 2011);
Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850-51 (Colo. 2015).
177. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (2021).
178. Id.
179. See Stacy A. Hickox, Drug Testing of Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace: An Inaccurate Test
of Impairment, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 273, 304–05 (2012).
180. See id.; Gerard H. Seijts & Grace O’Farrell, Urine Collection Jars Versus Video Games: Perceptions
of Three Stakeholder Groups Toward Drug and Impairment Testing Programs, 35 J. DRUG ISSUES 885, 891–92
(2005).
181. Seijts & Farrell, supra note 180, at 891.
182. PENELOPE J. PHILLIPS, EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO DRUG TESTING IN MINNESOTA 63 (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.felhaber.com/wp-content/uploads/Employers-Guide-to-Drug-Testing.pdf.

July 2022 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR MEDICAL CANNABIS PATIENTS

1583

objective computerized tests.183 One such test is the DRUID App, developed by
Michael Milburn, a psychologist at the University of Massachusetts Boston.184
The app has “users perform four tasks which test their reaction time, decisionmaking ability, hand-eye coordination, time estimation, and balance.”185 Other
similar tests include having “an employee keep a cursor on track during a
computer simulation.”186 Although objective computerized tests present their
own issues (such as when and how often does an employer have the right to
subject an employee to such a test), using a combination of resources will likely
provide a clearer answer as to whether a patient-employee is impaired.
Furthermore, using a combination of resources to test for impairment better
balances patient-employee and employer interests, reducing employers’
overreliance on workplace drug tests.
2. New York
As compared to Delaware, New York took a different approach to protect
patient-employees. Nonetheless, New York’s employee-protection statute
adequately addresses patient-employee and employer interests.187
New York incorporated its employee-protection statute into its disability
discrimination law by stating “[b]eing a certified patient shall be deemed to be
having a ‘disability’ under [the New York Human Rights Law].188 The New
York Human Rights Law states that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice”
for an employer to “refuse to hire . . . or to discharge from employment . . . or to
discriminate against” an employee because of the employee’s disability.189 Thus,
an employer cannot “refuse to hire,” “discharge from employment,” or
“discriminate against” a patient-employee based on their status as a medical
cannabis user.190 Furthermore, because patient-employees are deemed to have a
disability, an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation.191 New York
law defines a reasonable accommodation as “one which permits an employee
with a disability to perform in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the
job and does not impose an undue hardship on the employer’s business.”192 The
employee-protection statute contains two exceptions: (1) an employer can

183. See Hickox, supra note 179, at 305; Michael Milburn & William DeJong, A Paradigm Shift in
Impairment Testing for Cannabis: The DRUID App, MED. CANNABIS NETWORK (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.healtheuropa.eu/a-paradigm-shift-in-impairment-testing-for-cannabis-the-druid-app/94154/.
184. Linda Johnson, How to Test Employees for Cannabis Impairment, CANADIAN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.thesafetymag.com/ca/topics/technology/how-to-test-employees-for-cannabisimpairment/186973.
185. Milburn & DeJong, supra note 183.
186. Hickox, supra note 179, at 305.
187. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
188. Id.
189. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021).
190. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021).
191. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021).
192. Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 823 F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).
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prohibit a patient-employee “from performing his employment duties” while
impaired; and (2) the statute does not require any employer “to do any act that
would put the [employer] in violation of federal law or cause it to lose federal
funding.”193
New York’s approach addresses patient-employee interests by preventing
employers from discharging or refusing to hire medical cannabis users.194
Employers can reasonably accommodate patient-employees by allowing them
to consume cannabis outside of work hours.195 Despite these benefits, the statute
allows an employer to prohibit a patient-employee “from performing his
employment duties” while impaired, and it does not prohibit an employer from
using a positive drug test to demonstrate impairment.196 However, the statute
also does not expressly permit an employer to discharge a patient-employee for
being impaired. Rather, it only states that an employer can prohibit the patientemployee from performing his/her duties while impaired.197 Thus, the scope of
the statute’s protections for patient-employees is somewhat unclear, although
still far superior when compared to states such as California.198
The law also addresses employer interests. As stated above, the statute
allows employers to prohibit patient-employees from working while impaired,
which lessens the likelihood of civil liability caused by impaired patientemployees.199 However, like Delaware, the statute does not define how an
employer should detect that an employee is impaired.200 Further clarification on
how to detect impairment would benefit employers and patient-employees.
Nonetheless, New York’s approach appears to work in practice. Con-Edison,
one of the world’s largest energy companies,201 recently stated in litigation that
it accommodates or has accommodated at least forty-two employees who are
medical cannabis users.202 Moreover, it “has never terminated or disciplined any
of these employees because of their status as a medical marijuana patient [or]
their intent to become a patient.”203 An additional benefit to employers (and
courts) is the placement of the employee-protection statute within the New York
Human Rights Law.204 Unlike newly enacted statutory language that can lead to
193. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
194. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney
2021).
195. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021). Nevada’s employee-protection statute also
requires employers to reasonably accommodate patient-employees. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 678C.850 (2020).
196. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
197. See id.
198. Compare id., with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.45 (West 2017).
199. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
200. See id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (2021).
201. See About Con Edison, CONEDISON, https://www.coned.com/en/about-us/company-information (last
visited July 1, 2022).
202. See Memorandum of L. in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Gordon v. Consol.
Edison, Inc., 190 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2020) (No. 152614/2017), 2019 WL 8631146.
203. Id.
204. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2021).
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confusing interpretations, employers are familiar with the New York Human
Rights law. Thus, the placement of the employee-protection statute within the
New York Human Rights law likely reduced uncertainty for employers.
3. Arizona, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Oklahoma
At first glance, Arizona, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Oklahoma’s
employee-protection statutes appear to provide adequate protection for patientemployees on par with Delaware and New York.205 In fact, like Delaware and
New York, courts in Arizona and Rhode Island have recognized an implied
private right of action in their respective medical cannabis statutes—something
that California, Michigan, and Washington courts refused to recognize.206
Furthermore, in 2018, a patient-employee in Connecticut won a motion for
summary judgment against her employer after they fired her based on her status
as a medical cannabis patient under Connecticut law.207 Despite their relative
success in protecting patient-employees, when examined closer, each of these
states’ statutes contain gaps and exceptions that could allow an employer to
unreasonably discriminate against patient-employees.208
For example, Arizona’s employee-protection statute contains nearly the
exact same language as Delaware’s statute.209 Both statutes allow an employer
to terminate a patient-employee that was impaired on the job.210 However, where
Delaware’s statute states that an employer cannot prove an employee was
impaired based solely on a positive drug test, Arizona’s statute states that an
employer can prove impairment based on a positive drug test when “the presence
of metabolites or components of marijuana” in the drug test appear in a sufficient
concentration to cause impairment.211 As stated previously, there is no test that
can currently measure impairment by cannabis based on the level of metabolites

205. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2813–2814 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 427.8 (2019); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019).
206. Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 359 F. Supp. 3d 761, 781 (D. Ariz. 2019) (“Following Noffsinger
and Chance, the Court concludes that there is an implied private cause of action for violations of [Arizona’s
Medical Marijuana Act].”); Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., No. PC-2014-5680, 2017 WL 2321181, at
*8 (R.I. Super. May 23, 2017) (“Given . . . the context of the provision—an anti-discrimination statute—this
Court finds that there is an implied private right of action for violations of [Rhode Island’s medical cannabis
statute].”); Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colo.) LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 594 (Wash. 2011); Casias v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2012); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1228–
29 (D.N.M. 2016); Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204, 208 (Cal. 2008).
207. Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 338 F. Supp. 3d 78, 86 (D. Conn. 2018).
208. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2813–2814 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 427.8 (2019); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney
2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (2021).
209. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2813–2814 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A
(2021).
210. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2813–2814 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A
(2021).
211. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2813–2814 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A
(2021).
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and components present in an individual’s drug test.212 Thus, Arizona’s
employee-protection statute leaves uncertain what level of cannabis components
in a patient-employee’s test indicates impairment and, more importantly, likely
still allows an employer to discriminate against an employee based on a positive
drug test that may or may not indicate a patient-employee was actually
impaired.213 Thus, as compared to Delaware, Arizona’s employee-protection
statute provides less protection for patient-employees.214
Rhode Island and Connecticut’s employee-protection statutes suffer from
similar flaws.215 Those statutes do not protect patient-employees from
termination based on the failure of a drug test.216 Both statutes allow an employer
to fire a patient-employee if the employee was “under the influence of” cannabis
at the workplace.217 Thus, theoretically, an employer could use a positive drug
test as proof that a patient-employee was “under the influence of” cannabis at
the workplace and therefore terminate them.218 This is problematic because, as
discussed previously, a positive drug test for cannabis is not an indication that
the employee was ever impaired at work.219
Similarly, Oklahoma’s employee-protection statute, on its face, looks
promising for patient-employees.220 It prohibits employers from “refus[ing] to
hire, discipline, discharge, or otherwise penalize an applicant or employee”
based on their “status as a medical marijuana licensee” or “on the basis of a
positive test for marijuana components or metabolites.”221 However, these
protections do not apply if “the licensee possesses, consumes, or is under the
influence” of cannabis at work or the employee’s position “is one involving
safety-sensitive functions.”222 The statute broadly defines “safety-sensitive” as
“any job that includes tasks or duties that the employer reasonably believes could
affect the safety and health of the employee performing the task or others.”223
Depending on how broadly a court is willing to read the statute’s language, a job
not normally thought of as safety-sensitive could qualify.224 For example, while
all courts would likely agree that an employee who operates heavy machinery is
a position “involving safety-sensitive functions,” what about a grocery store
clerk who restocks shelves with heavy food products or a gas station attendant
212. See Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana, supra note 110.
213. See id.; Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 359 F. Supp. 3d 761, 789 (D. Ariz. 2019).
214. See Whitmire, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 789; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 4905A, 4907A (2021).
215. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019).
216. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019).
217. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019).
218. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p (2021); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019); Kathleen Harvey,
Protecting Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 209, 224 (2015).
219. See Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana, supra note 110.
220. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 427.8 (2019).
221. See id.
222. See id. (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. See Brennan T. Barger, Into the Weeds of the Newest Field in Employment Law: The Oklahoma
Medical Marijuana Act, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 379–80 (2020).

July 2022 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR MEDICAL CANNABIS PATIENTS

1587

who may occasionally have to refill a customer’s propane tank?225 These
hypotheticals illustrate the elasticity of Oklahoma’s definition of “safetysensitive functions” that likely will create a headache for courts to interpret.226
In sum, states have approached the protection of patient-employees in a
variety of ways, each with benefits and drawbacks. The next section will discuss
what approach California should take.
III. HOW CALIFORNIA SHOULD PROTECT MEDICAL CANNABIS USERS
Since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ross, the California
Legislature has attempted but ultimately failed to enact employment protections
for patient-employees.227 Based on the approaches taken by Delaware and New
York, this Part will advocate for adopting a similar approach—keeping in mind
California’s past failures to enact employment protections, employers’ interests,
and the lessons learned from states like Arizona, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Oklahoma.
Past attempts by the California Legislature to enact an employee-protection
statute mirrored both Delaware and New York’s approach.228 In 2008, shortly
after the Ross decision, Assemblymember Mark Leno introduced AB 2279,
which—like Delaware’s employee-protection statute—would have made it
“unlawful for an employer to discriminate” against a patient-employee based on
the patient-employee’s status as a medical cannabis user or a “positive drug
test,” provided that the patient-employee did not use cannabis on work premises
or during the hours of employment.229 However, the bill also contained an
exception that likely would have swallowed the bill’s intended protections. The
exception, referred to as the “savings clause,” stated that “[n]othing in this
section shall prohibit an employer from terminating the employment of . . . an
employee who is impaired” at work.230 The bill did not define impairment, nor
did it prohibit an employer from using a positive drug test to prove
impairment.231 Thus, despite prohibiting discharge on the basis of a drug test,
the savings clause would have potentially allowed an employer to terminate a
patient-employee by using a positive drug test as evidence that an employee was
impaired at work.232 For example, assume a patient-employee was a construction
worker who caused an accident that injured a fellow construction worker. After
the accident, the patient-employee tested positive for cannabis. Under AB 2279,
225. See id.
226. See id.; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 427.8 (2019).
227. See Assemb. B. 2279, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); Assemb. B. 2069, 2017-18 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2018); Assemb. B. 2355, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
228. Compare Assemb. B. 2279, supra note 227, and Assemb. B. 2069, supra note 227, and Assemb. B.
2355, supra note 227, with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16
§§ 4905A, 4907A (2021).
229. See Assemb. B. 2279, supra note 227.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
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the employer could not fire the employee based solely on the positive drug
test.233 However, nothing in AB 2279 would prevent the employer from
terminating the patient-employee by using the positive drug test as evidence that
the employee was impaired on the job.234 Thus, the statute failed to adequately
protect patient-employees because it did not prohibit an employer from using a
positive drug test to prove impairment.235
AB 2355, introduced by Assemblymember Rob Bonta, was akin to New
York’s employee-protection statute. However, it likely provided less protection
for patient-employees.236 The bill would have incorporated protections for
patient-employees into the framework of FEHA—requiring employers to
provide a “reasonable accommodation” to patient-employees.237 The bill’s
legislative intent section expressly denounced workplace drug tests by stating,
“[c]urrent workplace drug testing technology, such as urine testing,
discriminates against medical cannabis use that has occurred days or weeks
previously because it detects cannabis metabolites, not the compounds, like
THC, that have a psychoactive effect.”238 The bill also permitted employers to
utilize impairment testing.239 Both the denunciation of workplace drug tests and
the encouragement of impairment testing would have helped address patientemployee interests. However, the text of the statute permitted an employer to
terminate a patient-employee if the employee was impaired on the job, and it did
not prohibit an employer from using a positive drug test to prove impairment.240
Thus, AB 2355 provided less protection for patient-employees when compared
to Delaware’s and New York’s employee protection statutes.241
Although both AB 2279 and AB 2355 were a step in the right direction,
they would not have afforded patient-employees the same level of protection as
patients in New York or Delaware. Thus, in order to enact legislation that
adequately protects patient-employees and recognizes employer concerns, the
California Legislature should enact legislation that includes the following
components:
•

The Legislature should state that all patient-employees have a “disability”
as the term is defined in FEHA. Therefore, like New York, California
employers would have to provide a reasonable accommodation to patientemployees and could not refuse to hire job applicants on the basis of a

233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Compare Assemb. B. 2355, supra note 227, with N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018).
Assemblymember Bonta also introduced AB 2355 which was similar to AB 2069 but provided an exception that
would have allowed an employer to use a positive drug test to evidence that an employee was impaired on the
job. See Assemb. B. 2069, supra note 227.
237. See Assemb. B. 2355, supra note 227.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
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positive drug test or their status as a medical cannabis patient. Like any
other employee that uses prescription drugs, employers can discharge
patient-employees if the patient-employee’s use of medical cannabis
“either prevents [them] from performing the essential job functions of
their position or creates a direct threat to the health or safety
of . . . others.”242
To address employer concerns, the statute should also contain two
exceptions. First, the statute should not require employers to abide by it
if doing so would place them in violation of federal law or would cause
them to lose federal funding. Second, the statute should permit employers
to discipline or discharge a patient-employee if the employee possesses,
uses, or is impaired by cannabis while at work or during working hours.
However, the statute must expressly state that an employer cannot prove
impairment solely on the basis of a positive drug test. In other words, an
employer must present evidence other than a positive drug test, to prove
that a patient was impaired. Although allowing an employer to discharge
an employee based on possession, use, or impairment weakens the
protections afforded to patient-employees, doing so is politically
necessary. As evidenced by both AB 2279 and AB 2355, an employeeprotection statute that protects a patient-employee to the same degree as
an employee using prescription drugs—meaning an employer could only
discharge a patient-employee if their cannabis use either prevented them
from performing their job duties or created a direct threat to the health
and safety of others—likely would not be enacted by the Legislature.
Thus, the possession, use, and impairment exception is necessary for
political viability.
To further ease concerns of employers who may be wary of a bill that
prohibits the use of a positive drug test to prove impairment, the
Legislature should explore options to limit an employer’s exposure to
civil liability caused by patient-employees. One option could be to bar
the use of a patient-employee’s positive drug test against an employer.
For example, if a patient-employee caused a workplace accident that
injured a third-party and the third-party later sued the employer for
negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior,243 the Legislature
could bar the third-party from using a patient-employee’s positive drug
test as evidence that the employer was negligent.
The legislation should limit the term “cannabis” to psychoactive cannabis
products that could cause an individual to become impaired. Because
non-psychoactive cannabis products, like CBD, cannot cause a patient-

242. DUNPHY & MILLER, supra note 142, at 18–19.
243. See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (“Under the respondeat
superior doctrine, ‘an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the
scope of employment.’”) (citations omitted).
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employee to become impaired,244 employers likely would not be
concerned about their use in the workplace. Thus, banning the use of nonpsychoactive cannabis products in the workplace would not serve
employer interests and would unfairly prejudice patient-employees.
Therefore, non-psychoactive cannabis products such as CBD lotions and
oils should not be prohibited unless doing so would cause an employer to
violate federal law or lose federal funding.
Lastly, the Legislature should designate a legislative task force to further
tackle complicated details, such as what sorts of evidence of impairment
employers may use, how to further limit employer liability, and which
cannabis products should be considered non-psychoactive.

This approach is the best approach for California for several reasons. First,
it incorporates the best aspects of both Delaware’s and New York’s employeeprotection statutes. Incorporating the statute into FEHA’s framework provides
clarity and certainty for employers, courts, and attorneys who are familiar with
FEHA’s procedures and legal standards. Furthermore, this approach prevents
employers from using only a positive drug test to show impairment—avoiding
the loopholes present in AB 2279 and AB 2355.245 Second, it effectively
overturns Ross, requiring employers to reasonably accommodate patientemployees and permitting patient-employees to assert a cause of action under
FEHA.246 Third, it considers employer interests. Employers will be able to avoid
conflict with federal law and minimize the risk of workplace accidents and
injuries by having the power to discharge an impaired patient-employee. Fourth,
this approach has been proven to work in practice, as shown by Con-Edison’s
accommodation of more than forty patient-employees in New York.247 Lastly,
and most importantly, it protects patient-employees like Brandon Coats and
Garry Ross, who were put in the impossible position of choosing between
treating their disabilities or keeping their jobs.248
CONCLUSION
As the law currently stands in California, an employer can refuse to hire an
applicant or discharge an employee for consuming medical cannabis in order to
treat a serious medical condition, even if an individual consumes cannabis at
home during non-working hours.249 As exemplified by the sixteen states that
244. See Kathleen Doheny, Study: CBD from Marijuana Doesn’t Impair Driving, WEBMD (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/addiction/news/20201202/study-cbd-from-marjiuana-doesnt-impairdriving.
245. See Assemb. B. 2279, supra note 227; Assemb. B. 2355, supra note 227.
246. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204, 208 (Cal. 2008).
247. See Memorandum of L. in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Gordon v. Consol.
Edison, Inc., 190 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2020) (No. 152614/2017), 2019 WL 8631146.
248. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 202; Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015).
249. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 203 (“Under California law, an employer may require preemployment drug tests
and take illegal drug use into consideration in making employment decisions.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362.45 (West 2017) (“Section 11362.1 does not amend, repeal, affect, restrict, or preempt: (f) The rights
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provide employment protection for patient-employees,250 California’s approach
is outdated. To remedy this problem, the Legislature must enact legislation
protecting patient-employees while still recognizing employer interests. To do
so, the Legislature should follow the approach advocated for in this Note. If the
Legislature follows this approach, California will be able to reclaim its spot as a
leader in the cannabis arena, and, more importantly, it will prevent employers
from unfairly discriminating against medical cannabis patients.

and obligations of public and private employers to maintain a drug and alcohol free workplace . . . or affect the
ability of employers to have policies prohibiting the use of cannabis by employees and prospective employees,
or prevent employers from complying with state or federal law.”) (emphasis added).
250. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813 (2015); ARK. CONST. amend. XCVIII § 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a408p (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (2021); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/40 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
22 § 2430-C (2018); MINN. STAT. § 152.32 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 678C.850 (2020); N.J. REV. STAT. 24:6I6.1 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-9 (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369 (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63 § 427.8 (2019); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10231.2103 (2016); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2019); S.D.
§ 34-20G-22 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 16A-15-4 (2017).
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